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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Network centric warfare (NCW) is a concept of operations that seeks to increase combat power 
by linking battlespace entities to effectively leverage information superiority.  A network centric force 
must be supported by sophisticated automated systems, so human-computer interactions are an 
important aspect of overall performance.  These interactions are examples of human supervisory 
control (HSC), in which a human operator intermittently interacts with a computer, receiving 
feedback from and providing commands to a controlled process or task environment, which is 
connected to that computer.  The Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized that a lack of 
understanding of HSC issues relevant to NCW is a significant barrier limiting NCW’s potential 
benefits.  This report identifies eight central HSC issues that could significantly impact operator 
performance in NCW: Appropriate levels of automation, information overload, adaptive automation, 
distributed decision-making through team coordination, complexity measures, decision biases, 
attention allocation, and supervisory monitoring of operators.   
The adoption of NCW principles is often misunderstood as requiring increased levels of automation, 
which makes this a particularly acute problem as NCW is implemented.  For the average operator, 
implementation of NCW will exponentially add to the number of available information sources as 
well as the volume of information flow.  Without measures to mediate this volume, information overload 
will occur much more often than in the past, as it will be far easier for operators to obtain or be given 
more information than they can adequately handle.  One way to alleviate this problem is through 
adaptive automation, which has been shown in certain cases to lower workload.  There will also be a 
corresponding increase in information complexity, quantified by complexity measures, which can cause a 
loss of situation awareness or an unmanageable increase in mental workload.  It is therefore essential 
that the interfaces with which NCW operators interact help to reduce and manage this increased level 
of data complexity.   
A more fundamental issue associated with the increase in the number of available information 
sources, volume of information, and operational tempo under NCW are operator attention allocation 
strategies.  NCW hinges on successful information sharing, so knowledge of the relationship between 
perceived and actual high priority tasks and associated time management strategies, as well as the 
impact of task disruptions is critical. As a result of NCW information sharing, command and control 
(C2) structures will change significantly.  Traditional methods where commands are passed down 
from higher levels in a command hierarchy will, at least, be partially replaced by distributed decision-
making and low-level team coordination.  Therefore, understanding how to make effective, time-
pressured decisions within these organizational structures takes on greater importance in NCW.  
These redefined C2 structures will drive an increase in information-sharing tempo and rapid 
decision-making.  Under these time pressures, the use of heuristics and other naturalistic decision-
making methods may be subject to undesirable decision biases, both for individuals and groups.  Lastly, 
how automated technology can be leveraged in order to observe and diagnose HSC issues during 
supervisory monitoring of operators is another significant area of concern since NCW will contain 
embedded HSC systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is Network Centric Warfare?  
 As stated by the Department of  Defense (DoD) in their 2001 Report to Congress, Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) is ‘no less than the embodiment of  an Information Age transformation of  
the DoD’ (DoD 2001).  It is a concept of  operations envisioned to increase combat power by 
effectively linking or networking knowledgeable entities in a battlespace.  Greater combat power is 
generated through the creation of  shared situational awareness, increased speed of  command, self-
synchronization*, and higher operational tempo, lethality and survivability (Alberts et al. 2000).   
 
 NCW’s basic tenets (Figure 1) are as follows (DoD 2001): 
 
(1) A robustly networked force improves information sharing.  
(2) Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness.  
(3) Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.  
(4) These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Tenets of NCW(Madni and Madni 2004) 
A force with these capabilities is therefore able to increase combat power by leveraging information 
superiority, rather than through the traditional method of sheer numerical superiority.   
 
 Almost as important as what NCW is, it must be said what it is not, as there are many myths 
surrounding the concept.  As Alberts (2000) outlined, the most common one is that NCW focuses 
primarily on the network.  In actuality, NCW is about utilizing networking principles to increase 
combat power.  Having a robust network in place to enable NCW is a prerequisite to achieving 
                                                     
* The ability of a force to organize and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up. 
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NCW’s goals, but it is only a part of the larger picture.  Second, there is a widespread misconception 
that NCW represents an attempt to automate warfare.  NCW is not about giving responsibility to the 
“network” or machines to run warfare.  Rather, it is about trying to exploit information to more 
effectively bring all of a force’s assets to bear on a particular situation.  There will be logical places for 
automation to help these processes occur more smoothly, but these are a consequence of NCW, not 
a reason for it in the first place. 
What is Human Supervisory Control? 
Human supervisory control (HSC) is the process by which a human operator intermittently 
interacts with a computer, receiving feedback from and providing commands to a controlled process 
or task environment, which is connected to that computer. Figure 2, adapted from Sheridan (1992) 
illustrates this concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Human Supervisory Control (Sheridan 1992) 
Human supervisory control is comprised of five generic functions, usually accomplished in the 
following cyclical order: planning a computer-based task, teaching the computer what was planned 
through various inputs, monitoring the computer’s actions for errors and/or failures, intervening 
when the plan has been completed or the computer requires assistance, and then the human learns 
from the experience (Sheridan 1992). 
The Role of  Human Supervisory Control in Network Centric Warfare 
 NCW is rooted in information superiority, generated by a robustly networked force that is 
supported by automated technologies and systems.  The resulting increase in use of automation is a 
fundamental component of NCW; thus in the context of human interaction, NCW is a high level 
human supervisory control problem.  The number and types of human-machine supervisory 
interfaces will expand accordingly, as full-automation (no human involvement) of most tasks is 
difficult to achieve.  Fully automated systems require highly reliable error handling capabilities and 
the ability to effectively deal with unforeseen circumstances and faults (Parasuraman et al. 2000).  
This level of reliability is difficult if not impossible to achieve in the NCW domain, and even if this 
level of automation were possible, it may not be implemented due to users’ lack of trust.     
 
Due to the increasing importance of HSC in NCW, the DoD has recognized that a lack of 
automation reliability and understanding of relevant HSC issues, as experienced both by individuals 
and teams, are among the primary barriers limiting exploitation of the full potential of NCW (DoD 
2001).  The following report seeks to identify, describe and prioritize HSC tasks within existing NCW 
systems that exhibit or are at most risk of exhibiting degraded performance due to the complexity of 
networked systems.  In addition, MIT NCW research capabilities are discussed along with an outline 
of those current agencies that are conducting similar research in command and control arenas. 
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CENTRAL NCW HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL ISSUES -  OUTLINE 
Eight major human supervisory control issues have been identified as having the most impact on 
operator performance during NCW: 
 
• Appropriate Levels of Automation 
o What level of automation is most useful for different aspects of NCW 
tasks, particularly data fusion? 
 
• Information Overload 
o At what point does information cognitively saturate operators even 
though it is perfectly reliable? 
 
• Adaptive Automation 
o How should NCW operators deal with transient information overload?  
Moreover, should the computer determine this or should the human 
adjust workload levels? 
 
• Distributed Decision-Making and Team Coordination 
o Does adding more decision makers help or hinder NCW/HSC 
processes, and how can team members effectively share the load and 
maintain coordination? 
 
• Complexity Measures 
o How can complexity of NCW tasks be characterized and how does this 
impact human performance?  
 
• Decision Biases  
o When there are uncertainties and multiple plausible hypotheses, how 
can technology mitigate human tendencies to use inappropriate 
heuristics and become biased in making decisions? 
 
• Attention Allocation 
o When there is a mix of different preview times (time to consider the 
signals before something has to be done), namely some urgent, some 
not so urgent, how can a human best allocate attention, and how can 
the computer help? 
 
• Supervisory Monitoring of Operators 
o How can a supervisor (either a computer or a human) effectively detect 
decreases in performance across multiple human operators, and how 
should the supervisor respond to them? 
 
Table 1 demonstrates how the issues above relate to the primary HSC elements of planning, 
communicating the plan, monitoring the plan’s execution, intervening when necessary, and learning.  
It is salient to note that planning has been recognized as a central part of nearly all issues, while 
learning plays a more minor role in our focus on supporting relevant technologies.  This does not 
mean that the learning elements of HSC are not important, just that they are less relevant in the 
context of the technology focus of this investigation. 
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Table 1. Major HSC issues in NCW and their primary elements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Planning Communicating Monitoring Intervention Learning
Appropriate Levels of 
Automation x x x
Information Overload x
Adaptive Automation x x x
Distributed Decision-Making 
and Team Coordination x x
Complexity Measures x x x x
Attention Allocation x
Decision Biases and Heuristics x
Supervisory Monitoring of 
Operators x x x x
Primary HSC ElementsIssue
x 
x 
x 
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KEY DEFINITIONS 
TASK: Specified variables must be brought to specified states under given time constraints. 
 
AUTOMATION:  When some variables are in specified states, IF...THEN mechanisms are applied 
and change certain (and possibly other) variables in specified ways. 
 
ADAPTIVE AUTOMATION:  Either the IF...THEN rules change by themselves based on the 
operator’s state or performance, or the operator can change the IF...THEN rules at will. 
 
NETWORK CENTRIC:  Two or more human operators access information from each other and 
the system about remote activities.  The communication can be subject to noise and/or constraints 
of delay, etc. 
 
SUPERVISORY CONTROL:  Operators activate and deactivate automation (and change the rules 
insofar as it is adaptive) in an effort to perform a given task. 
 
MANUAL CONTROL:  Operators use available controls to perform the task directly without the 
aid of automation. 
 
HIGH WORKLOAD or COMPLEXITY:  Many tasks are being posed and/or the variables 
within these tasks are changing simultaneously and rapidly so that it is difficult for the operator to 
maintain understanding of the unfolding situation. 
 
DATA FUSION: Putting together information in a more comprehensible format, possibly with 
some advice on what to do (the latter being DECISION AIDING). 
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CENTRAL NCW HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL ISSUES -  DETAIL 
1. APPROPRIATE LEVELS OF AUTOMATION 
The Patriot missile system has a history of friendly fire incidents that can at least be partially attributed to a 
lack of understanding of human limitations in supervisory control.  In the recent war on Iraq, there were 12 
Patriot engagements—but three of them with our own planes.  On March 23rd, 2003, a RAF Tornado 
GR4 was shot down in friendly airspace by a Patriot.  Two days later, a USAF F-16 fighter pilot received 
a warning that he was being targeted by hostile radar, and fired a missile in self-defense.  It was a Patriot 
missile battery aiming at him.  On April 2nd, 2003, just nine days later, another Patriot shot down a US 
Navy F/A-18 returning home from a mission.  The Patriot missile has two modes: semi-automatic 
(management by consent) and automatic (management by exception).  These friendly fire incidents are believed 
to be a result of automatic mode, as there are known “ghosting” problems with the radar and occasional 
troubles with friend or foe aircraft identification responses.  Under management by exception, a short time 
period of approximately 15 seconds is allowed to reject a computer’s decision, which may often be insufficient 
to solve such difficulties adequately.  Despite obvious flaws in the operation of automatic mode, it is still 
frequently used by Patriot crews.  Because of problems inherent in the system, it may be that more human 
involvement in the firing process will reduce the probability of accidents, which would constitute a lowering of 
the level of automation. 
Automation is not simply ‘on’ or ‘off’; there is a range of levels where allocation of function is 
shared between man and machine.  Sheridan and Verplank (1978) outlined a scale from 1-10 where 
each level represented the machine performing progressively more tasks than the previous one, as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human interaction with automation represents a range of intermediate levels from 2-6 on this 
scale.  For routine operations, higher levels of automation (LOAs) in general result in lower mental 
workload, while the opposite is true for low levels of automation (Kaber et al. 2000).  However, if 
automation fails, workload can grow rapidly.  Optimal human performance in monitoring occurs at 
moderate levels of workload; the relationship between workload and performance is given by the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes and Dodson 1908) shown in Figure 3.   
Table 2. Levels of Automation (Sheridan and Verplank 1978)
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It is possible to have a LOA too high or too low, each with its own distinct set of problems 
(Billings 1997): 
 
• HSC problems if LOA is too high 
o Manual or mental skill degradation 
o Loss of situational awareness due to lack of automation transparency, complexity, 
and inadequate feedback 
o More advanced automation issues such as brittleness & literalism; in other words, 
the automated system might not be able to handle novel or unexpected events, as 
well as operate effectively in conditions near or at the edge of the intended 
operating envelope 
o Time and difficulty to diagnose failures and manually take over 
  
• HSC problems if LOA is too low 
o Cognitive and working memory overload in routine tasks under time pressure 
o Human decision biases and heuristics 
o Lack of repeatability and consistency 
o Complacency and boredom 
o Greater human interdependency and chaos when something fails, unless fail soft 
safeguards are in place 
 
NCW is often misunderstood as focusing entirely on technology upgrades (Alberts et al. 2000) 
with the implied assumption that this will result in increased automation, and hence improved 
performance.  There are several factors behind this misconception, including:  
 
• The amount of information available under NCW is greater than ever before, 
• The synthesis of this additional data to gain understanding and situational awareness is more 
abstract and therefore more difficult to interpret (e.g. interaction with geographically distant 
teams, etc), 
• Expectations of increased combat tempo require faster decisions and actions that are 
perceived as needing additional automation to achieve, and 
• The addition of automation on top of automation adds complexity, and thus confusion if the 
operator is called upon to diagnose and find problems. 
 
Figure 3. The Yerkes-Dodson Law
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These factors highlight both the intrinsic need for automation and the difficulties that will be 
encountered with complex automated systems.  Care must be taken to consider each of the roles 
human and machine has in the collaborative interaction that is HSC, and automation only introduced 
when there is a specific need to do so (Billings 1997).  This will ensure better overall performance 
across the dynamically changing set of responsibilities assigned to operators in NCW.   
 
As automation has become more complex and capable of accomplishing a much wider range of 
tasks, a need for more flexible human-automation interaction has arisen.  For this reason, 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) proposed that most tasks could be broken down into four separate 
information processing stages (information acquisition, information analysis, decision selection and 
action implementation), and that each could be assigned a level of automation separate and possibly 
different from the others.  However, in the context of flexible human-automation interaction, 
subdividing a problem into these abstract stages may not go far enough.  As proposed by Miller and 
Parasuraman (2003), each information processing task can be further divided into simple sub-tasks 
with differential levels of automation.  For NCW, generalized cognitive tasks under these proposed 
information processing stages can be defined: 
 
• Information acquisition 
o Monitoring resources (such as friendly forces) 
o Monitoring systems (such as surveillance networks) 
o Communications 
• Information analysis 
o Data fusion & display techniques 
• Decision selection 
o Planning 
o Re-planning 
o Rapid resource allocation 
• Action implementation 
o Individual vs. team interaction 
 
Human supervisory control interactions with automation primarily fall under the analysis and 
decision processes (Figure 4). Of these two stages, information analysis is the one most affected by 
conversion of the military to network-centric principles, as the number and variety of available 
information sources to a robustly networked force is expected to increase dramatically.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Proposed interactive process overlaying human information processing (Sheridan 2002) 
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The potential for cognitive overload in the information analysis phase for NCW is likely to be 
caused by problems with data fusion.  Data fusion in this sense is defined as the process by which 
raw information from disparate sources is filtered and integrated into relevant groupings before being 
displayed to users.  The LOA of data fusion can vary.  Low levels of automation could include trend 
or predictive displays for single or multiple variables of interest, such as for tracking of enemy forces.  
Higher levels could include smart agents providing context dependent summaries of relevant 
information to users (Parasuraman et al. 2000).   
 
Trust issues are a critical factor to consider when choosing an appropriate LOA for data fusion 
in NCW.  The process of data fusion is not always perfect; the automated data fuser could, for 
example, omit important pieces of information in certain circumstances by misunderstanding the 
context, or combine data sources incorrectly.  This has implications for performance, as to fully and 
appropriately use automation an operator’s trust must be calibrated to a level corresponding to the 
machine’s or function’s trustworthiness (Muir 1987).  In this case, if a NCW operator has too much 
trust in the automation driving data fusion, they may rely on it even when it has made obvious errors.  
The opposite may also be true.  Distrusting the data fusion algorithm when it is perfectly capable 
may lead to disuse or deliberate misinterpretation of its results to fit the operator’s mental models, 
even if this is very demanding and/or time consuming (Muir 1987).  A possible solution to this is to 
introduce a human-computer collaborative element to data fusion, whereby the operator is allowed 
to determine what data elements are fused at what times, depending on their comfort level with the 
automation.  Displaying the automation’s confidence in various aspects of its display to users also 
would facilitate better calibration of trust and operator understanding of the data fusion process.   
Research should also be undertaken to determine appropriate levels of automation for the 
aforementioned tasks, both individually and in combination with other tasks.  A possibility would be 
to measure performance in a typical NCW situation with varying levels of automation.  In addition to 
typical measures such as response time, accuracy of responses, etc, the ability to objectively gauge an 
operator’s ability to understand what is happening in the network will be critical.  Thus, an objective 
situation awareness (SA) metric will also need to be developed.  Development of an increased level 
of shared situation awareness and knowledge (SSAK) is major high level tenet of NCW (DoD 2001), 
and is critical to realizing NCW’s promise of substantial increases in combat power.  Yet, a general 
objective measurement of situational awareness has been elusive.  Direct system performance 
measures that use specific scenario manipulations to measure targeted aspects of SA are appropriate 
only in limited situations in which SA drives performance. However, the correlation between SA and 
performance in these cases is debated (Pew 2000).  Direct experimental techniques, such as the 
SAGAT (Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique) (Endsley 1988), have been used in 
command and control research, but are not without problems.  Questions remain as to whether 
SAGAT measurement techniques disrupt task performance, and if expectation of probes alters 
peoples’ natural behaviors (Pew 2000).  Instead, subjective measures have traditionally been used in 
the human supervisory command and control domain, whereupon subjects self-rate their level of SA.  
It has been shown that these methods are of limited utility, providing more insight to judgment 
processes than situation awareness (Jones 2000).   
2. INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
On March 28th, 1979, the worst US commercial nuclear power plant accident in history occurred at Three 
Mile Island in Middletown, Pennsylvania.  The problem began when a main feedwater pump failure caused 
the reactor to automatically shut-down.  In response to this, a relief valve opened to reduce the pressure of the 
system, but stuck open.  There was no indication to plant controllers that this had occurred.  Due to the stuck 
valve, there was significant loss of reactor coolant water, subsequently causing the core of the reactor to 
overheat.  There were no instruments that showed the level of coolant in the core, so it was thought to be 
acceptable based on the pressurizer coolant level.  This lead to a series of human actions that actually made 
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the problem worse, ending with a partial meltdown of the core.  Operators were overwhelmed with alarms and 
warnings, numbering in the hundreds, over a very short period of time.  They did not possess the cognitive 
capacity to adequately deal with the amount of information given to them during the unfolding events.  
Instead, they coped by focusing their efforts on several wrong hypotheses, ignoring some pieces of information 
that were inconsistent with their mental model.  
 
According to the DoD, the Global Information Grid (GIG) will be the enabling building block 
behind NCW and its promised benefits of information and decision superiority over foes (Figure 5). 
The GIG is the end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for 
collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating information to those who require it, on the 
battlefield or otherwise (DoD 2001).   
Metcalf’s Law states that the usefulness, or utility, of a network equals the square of the number 
of users (Shapiro and Varian 1999); what this means is that these promised networking capabilities 
will allow forces to have access to exponential amounts of information over today’s forces.  Thus, 
information intake for the average operator under NCW will be increased.  Even if the information 
complexity does not increase (which is unlikely), mental workload will increase accordingly.  As 
previously mentioned, the Yerkes-Dodson Law illustrates that beyond a task-dependent moderate 
level of arousal, an individual will become cognitively overloaded and their performance will drop.  
The problem is being able to predict when and how this overload will occur, so that the amount of 
information any single person or group is required to process is manageable.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  The GIG as a building block of NCW (DoD 2001) 
Shannon information theory (Shannon 1948) formally quantifies how much information is 
conveyed by an event.  It is influenced by three variables:  (1) The number of possible events, (2) The 
probabilities of those events, and (3) Sequential constraints, in other words, the context in which the 
events occur.  In essence, this can be summarized by the following statement: The less the 
expectation of an event, the greater the information that is conveyed by it.  For our purposes, we are 
interested in measuring the average information conveyed by a series of events with differing 
probabilities over time.  The average bits of information (Have) is given by: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑ =
i
i
n
iave P
PH 1log21  , where Pi = probability of event “i”, given previous events 
 
 Humans may be modeled as an information channel (Figure 6), where we want to know how 
much information is transmitted from stimulus to response, and the bandwidth.  Important elements 
include stimulus inputs, such as display elements or voice transmissions (HS), and response 
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information (HR), such as decisions made due to this information.  The response is composed of 
information faithfully transmitted (HT) and irrelevant noise introduced into the signal.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A model of information transmission (Wickens and Hollands 2000) 
 
The stimulus information that is lost is HLOSS; this could represent information on a display 
presented to an operator, but not observed, or forgotten in later actions requiring this data.  
Essentially, variety in the stimuli does not show up in the response.  This would be associated with 
cognitive overload, resulting from time pressure or a loss of SA.  Each of these variables in the 
information processing model can be measured according to the formula above.  Bandwidth is 
obtained by dividing HT by response time. 
 
Information theory could then be applied to studying the problem of information overload in 
NCW through several methods.  Taking some generic NCW tasks from Section 1, experiments could 
be run in which only one of these tasks was performed by an operator, with the stimuli and possible 
range of responses carefully defined so as to provide meaningful measurements of the above 
variables.  The information value of the stimuli could be increased during the experiment to discover 
a threshold above which HR degrades and to observe how the operator’s behavior deteriorates.  This 
could be repeated with different generic tasks, and then gradually with multiple tasks. With this 
knowledge, a general guideline for maximum information intake could be generated for single and 
combinations of generalized NCW tasks, as well as providing better knowledge of information 
overload.  Another approach would be to research information presentation that decreases 
information loss while still maintaining the same stimulus information content. 
3. ADAPTIVE AUTOMATION 
Instant messaging was a primary means of communication between Navy ships during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003. While instant messaging, otherwise known as chat, has many advantages for rapid 
response in critical time-pressure command and control situations, operational commanders have found it 
difficult to handle large amounts of information generated through chat, and then synthesize relevant 
knowledge from this information (Caterinicchia 2003).  Chat enables faster responses in time critical 
command and control situations, but as described by the military, managing and synthesizing the large 
amount of information transmitted can sometimes be a “nightmare”.  The addition of instant messaging in 
the command and control loop requires a division of attention from the primary task, which may not always 
be appropriate.  If the power of an intelligent automated and adaptive agent was harnessed so that the 
computer could determine more optimal scheduling patterns for the presentation of instant messages, it is 
possible that information would not be a detrimental interruption and overall human performance improved.   
 
Warfare is often characterized by long periods of inactivity followed by intense periods of action 
during which time-critical decisions must be made.  At these times performance is most critical, yet it 
will likely suffer due to the temporary information overload placed on the operator.  With NCW and 
the emergence of a robustly networked force, the amount of information available to military 
personnel at all levels is exponentially greater.  Therefore, the problem of information overload, 
particularly during brief bursts of actions, will become much more common. 
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One method to alleviate such problems is the use of adaptive automation (AA).  AA has been 
shown to improve task performance (Hilburn et al. 1997; Prinzel et al. 2003), situational awareness 
(Kaber and Endsley 2004) and lower workload (Prinzel et al. 2003).  Two important research 
questions to answer are (1) when to use adaptive automation to determine under what circumstances 
the LOA should change, and (2) whether the computer or the human decides to change the LOA. 
Changes in the level of automation can be driven by specific events in the task environment, models 
of operator performance and task load, physiological methods, or by changes in operator 
performance (Parasuraman et al. 1992). 
 
Specific cues in the environment used to change the LOA may be either time or event-related.  
For example, it may be determined that in order to maintain vigilance levels in a task, automation will 
be turned off for a certain period of time once an hour, forcing the operator to execute manual 
control during that period.  Alternatively, it may be known that particular events in the environment 
will cause higher levels of workload than desired for a short time, during which the automation can 
increase to compensate.  An example of this would be an operator responsible for multiple UAVs 
performing a bombing mission.  It is well known that the cruise and loiter phases of flight are low in 
workload, but that the approach and bombing phases require significant increase in human workload.  
As a preemptive measure, adaptive automation could increase the LOA during the periods of high 
workload automatically.  This approach is problematic because it is scenario specific, will not handle 
unexpected situations well (desired changes in LOA must be pre-determined), and does not take into 
account operator variability.  Some operators may have a much higher threshold for handling 
workload than others and thus may not require a change in LOA. 
 
A related method of cueing AA is through models of operator performance, as they can be used 
to predict the effectiveness of humans during particular processes and behaviors.  Therefore, the 
model’s forecasted level of operator mental workload or performance on any number of specified 
tasks can be used to change the LOA.  What is defined as an acceptable level of any measure 
predicted by the model must be carefully defined in advance.  As defined by Laughery and Corker 
(1997), there are two main categories of human performance models: reductionist and first principles.  
Reductionist models break down expected behaviors into successively smaller series of tasks until a 
level of decomposition is reached that can provide reasonable estimates of human performance for 
these task elements.  First principles models are based on structures that represent basic principles 
and processes of human performance.  Performance models offer the advantage of flexibility in the 
sense that they can apply to a large range of situations, even unexpected ones, but often are costly 
and difficult to develop, especially if higher reliabilities are desired. 
 
Psychophysiological measures such as the electroencephalogram (EEG), event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs), eye movements and electroculography (EOG), electrodermal activity (EDA), heart 
rate and heart rate variability (HRV), breathing rate and blood pressure have all been correlated with 
mental workload to varying degrees of success.  Experimentally, these methods are advantageous 
because they are not task specific and they can continuously record data.  The problem is that in the 
past, many devices used to take these measurements have been obtrusive and physically 
uncomfortable for subjects performing the experiments, creating a possible anxiety effect.  While this 
is still a barrier to overcome, technologies such as the LifeShirt®, wireless EEG sensor headsets 
(Berka et al. 2004) and stereo cameras for tracking eye movements without the use of headgear can 
provide more ecological measurements of psychophysiological metrics.  Other significant problems 
with psychophysiological measures are the large amount of noise present in readings, and extreme 
individual variability.  A way to lessen these effects is to use combinations of measurements taken in 
concert, as done by Wilson and Russell (2003).  They showed accuracies in excess of 85% classifying 
operator states in real-time using artificial neural networks trained on a battery of 43 physiological 
features.  However, while psychophysiological measures have been used to adaptively allocate 
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automation functions in research environments, because of the previously discussed limitations, 
transferring experimental AA to operational AA has not yet been demonstrated. 
 
  Of all possible psychophysiological measures, analysis of brain waves has historically been the 
primary method of investigating neural indexes of cognition (Fabiani et al. 2000).  Numerous studies 
have successfully used EEG measures of workload to discriminate between differences in operator 
attention and arousal (Berka et al. 2004; Kramer 1991; Pope et al. 1995).  They all used engagement 
indexes based on the ratios of different EEG bands (alpha, beta, theta, etc), alpha surpression, or 
increased beta levels to detect changes in workload.  However, as Prinzel et al. (2003) notes, EEG-
based systems are only able to measure gross overall changes in arousal, not different types or finer 
levels of cognitive load.  In contrast, the P300 component of ERPs has been associated with the 
availability of information processing resources, varying in amplitude as a function of primary task 
load, and its latency affected by stimulus evaluation time (Polich 1991; Rugg and Coles 1995).  The 
P300 has been documented as an effective measure of mental workload (Donchin et al. 1986; 
Kramer 1991).  Despite this, use of ERPs in non-laboratory settings to measure workload in real-
time has proven difficult, as they are obtained from averaging of EEG signals over a number of 
trials.  Methods for how to overcome this are under development, but Humphrey and Kramer (1994) 
were able to discriminate between different workload levels 90% of the time using only 1 to 11 
seconds of ERP data (approximately 1-11 trials).  
 
Eye movements have also been used extensively in a variety of studies.  Their main value is in 
distraction studies to identify areas of attention, but measures of blink duration, frequency and pupil 
diameter have been correlated with visual and cognitive workloads.  In general, eye blink duration 
and frequency decrease as both visual and/or cognitive workload increases (Hankins and Wilson 
1998; Orden et al. 2001; Veltman and Gaillard 1998).  Though pupil diameter is affected by ambient 
light levels, stimulus perception, and habituation, the degree of pupillary dilation has been shown to 
increase with higher cognitive loads (Andreassi 2000; Hess and Polt 1964; Orden et al. 2001).  
Specific characteristics of eye movements, such as fixation duration, dwell times and saccade 
durations are task-dependent and thus are extremely difficult to tie to changes in mental workload in 
a generalizable way.  However, Simon et al. (1993) demonstrated that the more general visual 
behavior of scanning patterns becomes more organized when task difficulty increases.   
 
Finally, AA may be based upon performance-based measures, whereupon some performance 
metric such as reaction time or task accuracy is used to determine mental workload.  While generally 
easier to measure and quantify than physiological measures, performance measures are generally task-
specific (not generalizable to other tasks) and often require the subjects to modify their natural task 
behavior to accommodate the experimental objectives.  For instance, in monitoring tasks, there are 
few specific actions that may be linked to performance.  Performance-based measures also may only 
give the experimenter discrete samplings of operator workload at specific intervals instead of a 
constant measurement.  This could be inappropriate for some applications characterized by rapid 
changes in the environment, necessitating quick switches between automation modes.   
 
It is clear that psychophysiological and performance-based measures complement each others’ 
strengths and weaknesses.  An experiment could be designed in which adaptive automation was 
driven by a combination of both, perhaps where the psychophysiological measure workload 
classification could be compared to one generated by the performance-based measure.  This in turn 
would help provide a better estimate of operator workload so that the adaptive automation could 
more effectively support transient information overload in NCW. 
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4. DISTRIBUTED DECISION-MAKING AND TEAM COORDINATION 
In 1994, Operation Provide Comfort was to provide humanitarian aid to over one million Kurdish refugees 
in northern Iraq in the wake of the first Gulf War.  As part of this, the US sought to stop Iraqi attacks on 
the Kurds by enforcing a no-fly zone.  The no-fly zone was patrolled by USAF fighters (F-15s), supported by 
airborne warning and control (AWAC) aircraft.  On April 14, 1994, two US Army Black Hawk 
helicopters were transporting U.S., French, British, and Turkish commanders, as well as Kurdish para-
military personnel across this zone when two US F-15 fighters shot them down, killing all 26 on board.  
The Black Hawks had previously contacted and received permission from the AWACs to enter the no-fly 
zone.   Yet despite this, AWACs confirmed that there should be no flights in the area when the F-15s 
misidentified the US helicopters as Iraqi Hind helicopters.  The teamwork displayed in this situation was a 
significant contributing factor to the friendly fire incident, as the F-15s never learned from AWACs that a 
friendly mission was supposed to be in the area.  It was later determined that the F-15 wingman backed up 
the other F-15’s decision that the targets were Iraqi forces despite being unsure, which was yet another 
breakdown in communication.  Each team member did not share information effectively, resulting in the 
distributed decision making of the AWACs and F-15s pilots to come to incorrect and fatal conclusions. 
Military forces in the 21st century are being thrust into a wider range of non-traditional roles, and 
so face more complex threats that often cannot be defeated by conventional tactics.  Thus, it is 
critical that the military be able to leverage all of its available information, and to have sufficient 
agility to apply the relevant resources to bear on emerging situations.  This is the driving force behind 
the US military’s transformation into the Information Age and NCW.  Unfortunately, the underlying 
traditional Industrial Age command and control processes of decomposition, specialization, 
hierarchy, optimization, deconfliction, centralized planning and decentralized execution (Alberts and 
Hayes 2003) are often at odds with this vision. 
In many ways, platform-centric command and control (C2) in the past was about avoiding 
distributed decision-making and minimizing team coordination.  Many decisions were made by a 
select few at the top level of command, and pains were taken to decompose various factions of the 
military into small, specialized niches that had little direct contact between one another (a hierarchical 
waterfall approach).  This has begun to change in recent times, and a fully realized vision of NCW 
will require that teams of people, not a few people at the top of a hierarchy, make decisions under 
time-pressure.   Therefore, understanding the issues unique to team-based coordination take on new 
importance in the context of NCW.  The question is how to make effective decisions between and 
within distributed teams, particularly in the complex, data-rich, and time-compressed situations often 
seen in military C2/NCW scenarios.   
Table 3. Team SA Requirements for Shared Information (Endsley and Jones 2001) 
Level 1 SA - Data
System
Environment
Other team members
Level 2 SA - Comprehension
Status relevant to own goals/requirements
Status relevant to other's goals/requirements
Effect of own actions/changes on others
Effect of other's actions on self and overall goal
Level 3 SA - Projection
Actions of team members  
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A fundamental building block of good decision making is a high level of situation awareness (SA) 
(Endsley 1995), and in the case of distributed decision-making a high level of team SA or shared 
situation awareness (SSA). Three levels of individual SA have been defined: 1) perception of 
important environmental cues, 2) comprehension of the situation, and 3) projection of future events 
and dynamics (Endsley 1995).  Team SA involves individual SA for each team member, plus the SA 
required for overlapping tasks and team interactions (Endsley 1995).  Endsley and Jones (2001) 
expanded upon this definition by outlining a layered model of how teams achieve high levels of team 
SA.  They detail what constitutes SA requirements in a team setting at each previously defined level 
(Table 3), the devices and mechanisms used to achieve shared SA, and SA processes that effective 
teams use.  Team SA devices include spoken and non-verbal communications, visual and audio 
shared displays, and a shared environment.  
Research could examine how individual and team SA can be enhanced through manipulation of 
these SA devices, mechanisms and processes in the context of information sharing in NCW tasks.  
Areas of particular relevance to NCW along these lines would be: data presentation, training, role 
allocation, team geographic distributions, communication, and team sizes.   
Distributed decision-making and team coordination would also benefit from investigations into 
organizational design, as applied to team selection for NCW.  Processing capabilities of humans are 
limited, so distribution of information, resources and tasks among decision-makers must be done in 
such a way that the cognitive load of each person is not exceeded.  Research has shown that 
organizations operate most efficiently when their structures and processes match their mission 
environments (Levchuk et al. 2002).  The traditional hierarchies omnipresent in the military today 
were designed for Industrial Age C2 processes and therefore will have reduced effectiveness when 
operating under NCW principles.  Alberts and Hayes (2003) offer one solution with their proposed 
‘edge organizations’, which are characterized by widespread information sharing and peer-to-peer 
relationships, but their design offers very few details on how to actually implement them.  However, 
while team-based research is a high priority issue to examine in NCW, it is in general a lengthy 
proposition.  Meaningful work is unlikely to be accomplished in the space of less than a year. 
5. COMPLEXITY MEASURES 
On July 3rd, 1998, 290 passengers and crew took off from Bandar Abbas airport in Iran on Iran Air 
Flight 655, bound for Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.  Tragically, it never made it as the Aegis class 
cruiser USS Vincennes shot down the flight over the Strait of Hormuz, killing all on board.  While many 
factors contributed to this accident, such as the tense atmosphere in the Gulf at that time due to the Iran-Iraq 
war, the root cause can be attributed to the complexity associated with USS Vincennes’ advanced tracking 
radar.  It was designed in the 1980s for open water battles with the Soviet Navy, and as such, was capable of 
tracking hundreds of missiles and airplanes simultaneously.  Efforts that might have mitigated the high level 
of complexity of this system were not undertaken in favor of improving the detection capabilities of the system.  
Two pieces of wrongly interpreted data resulting from the complexity of the HMI interface caused the ship’s 
commander to make the erroneous decision to fire on flight 655.  First, flight 655 was reported as decreasing 
in altitude when it was in fact doing the opposite, representing that it was not in an attack profile.  Second, 
the flight’s Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) signal, designed to differentiate between civilian and military 
aircraft, was misidentified as being Mode II (military) instead of Mode III (civilian). 
 
Information complexity is a growing problem in many domains, with particular applicability to 
NCW.  Complexity will be impacted by both the amount and sources of information, and will be 
further exacerbated in the future as sensor technologies improve and the volume of available data 
continues to grow.  NCW operators will be required to understand resultant critical relationships and 
behaviors of that data at the same or higher level than today.  As put by Miller (2000), the impacts of 
increased complexity on the human will usually be increased workload and/or unpredictability of the 
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system, both of which have a negative effect on human and system performance.  Greater system 
unpredictability is essentially equivalent to a reduced level of operator SA, and therefore to degraded 
ability to make informed, timely decisions.  There are also well known limitations to human 
performance (see Section 1) that are likely to be encountered as workload increases.  Therefore, it is 
important that the interfaces NCW operators interact with help to reduce and manage this increased 
level of data complexity.   
 
How available information is presented to humans is a significant factor in mitigating 
information complexity.  Properly designed human-machine interactive elements can ease workload 
by automating certain tasks such as data filtering, integration and decision support, but the opposite 
effect can occur in certain unexpected situations. One problem in mitigating information complexity 
is a lack of objective measures of complexity, for example, how a display supports knowledge-based 
reasoning.  This work has been underway in air traffic control (ATC) for some time (see Majumdar 
and Ochieng (2002) or Mogford et al. (1995) for a review), but has yet to be explored in the NCW 
domain.   
 
The first step to developing these objective measures of complexity is to define complexity as it 
relates to NCW processes.  Complexity, as defined by Merriam-Webster, is “the quality or state of 
being hard to separate, analyze, or solve”.  The use of the term ‘hard’ implies that complexity is 
relative, which was captured by Miller (2000) when he described the difference between actual and 
perceived complexity.  Perceived complexity results from those elements of a task or situation that 
make it hard to deal with, or in other words, what makes a system seem difficult.  Actual complexity 
implies the use of more objective criteria for complexity, and does not take into account humans’ 
perceptions of a task or situation. A lack of situation awareness can also unnecessarily complicate a 
person’s perception of a problem, increasing perceived complexity above actual complexity.   
 
While perceived complexity and actual complexity are related, for human supervisory control 
interactions in NCW systems (and for most HCI applications) the designer should be concerned 
most about perceived complexity, and how to make it significantly lower than actual complexity 
without losing critical elements of the situation. For example, cognitive strategies such as grouping 
and rule formation can help to reduce perceived complexity.  The primary characteristics underlying 
groupings in visual perception are proximity, similarity, common motion, symmetry, and good form. 
In addition, goal-oriented grouping that varies with the task at hand is common (Landry et al. 2001).   
 
Perceived complexity can be divided into three general dimensions: 1) Component complexity: 
the number and diversity of components, 2) Relational complexity: the number and diversity of links 
between components, and 3) Behavioral complexity: the number and diversity of behaviors system 
components can exhibit (Miller 2000).  Often, these dimensions are not independent and changes in 
complexity are driven by interactions between them.  For example, a common task in the military is 
for an operator to track and interact with multiple entities.  Examples of this type of action are in air 
defense warfare, where it could be an operator’s job to monitor and classify targets and tracks within 
a certain radius, or in land attack, where an operator could be in charge of targeting and re-tasking 
multiple missiles in flight.  An increase in the number of targets would increase component 
complexity, but it is likely that the proximity of these new entities to the existing ones also would be 
important (an increase in relational complexity).  It could also be possible that new tracks will exhibit 
some different behaviors than existing tracks (an increase in behavioral complexity), as would be the 
case with the entry of a new type of vehicle or missile in the previously mentioned scenarios.  
 
One area of research could be evaluating how complexity varies in typical NCW tasks and how 
increasingly complex information affects human decision-making and performance.  For example, 
control of four independent UAVs is likely to be less complex than control of four collaborative 
UAVs that have hidden states of knowledge and thus higher unpredictability.   In this case, the 
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number of vehicles (components) is not driving complexity; instead the relations and behaviors 
between the UAVs are.  Another significant area of exploration would be examining how receipt of 
different information types and combinations of types affects the perceived complexity of a situation.  
Information types may include probabilistic, discrete and continuous forms.   
6. DECISION BIASES  
On December 20th, 1995, American Airlines flight 965 was enroute to Cali, Colombia from Miami, 
Florida.  Extremely behind schedule, as it approached Cali, the flight crew accepted a modified, unplanned 
and unfamiliar arrival route.  Trusting the flight management system (FMS) to automatically come up with 
the next correct waypoint after having only entered the first letter of it, the captain mistakenly chose the 
computer’s first choice, an incorrect waypoint 132 miles northeast of Cali.  This resulted in a wide turn to the 
east, whereas the flight crew knew that they were supposed to be on a straight approach.  Recognizing 
something was wrong, but not exactly what, the flight crew took manual control, turning right again towards 
Cali.  Unfortunately, the approach into Cali was surrounded by mountains and flight 965 was now 
sufficiently off course that they flew into the side of a mountain, killing all but 4 aboard the Boeing 757.  A 
clear contributor to this accident was the automation bias displayed by both the captain and first officer.  They 
continued to rely on FMS-assisted navigation even when it became confusing and cognitively demanding 
during a critical segment of flight. 
A defining characteristic of NCW is the expected increased information-sharing tempo over 
platform-centric forces of the past, which will require rapid decision-making.  Humans in general, 
and especially under time pressure, do not make decisions according to rational theories.  Rather they 
act in a naturalistic decision-making (NDM) setting in which experience, intuition, and heuristics play 
a dominant role.  While NDM strategies are generally effective, the resulting decreased time of the 
OODA (observe-orient-decide-action) loop for decision-making under time pressure can cause these 
decisions to be subject to bias (reference the USS Vincennes incident.) It is well known that under 
uncertainty, humans generally employ heuristics as part of naturalistic decision-making in order to 
reduce cognitive load (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Wickens and Hollands 2000).  Heuristics can be 
useful, powerful tools, but also can introduce bias in decision making, especially when coupled with 
large amounts of information time pressures.  There are three main classes of heuristics, all of which 
apply to NCW and have their potential drawbacks: 
 
• Representative heuristic – probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which A resembles B 
o Potential problems 
 Insensitivity to prior probabilities of outcomes, sample size, and prediction 
 Misconceptions of chance 
 Can provide the illusion of validity 
 Tendencies of regression to the mean 
 
• Anchoring heuristic – an initial guess is proposed and adjusted based on new information 
o Potential problems 
 Insufficient adjustment 
 Biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events 
 
• Availability heuristic – probabilities of events are judged based on recency, simplicity 
o Potential problems 
 Biases due to retrievability of instances and/or effectiveness of a search set 
 Illusory correlation 
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Human are also prone to other decision biases to include:  
 
• Confirmation bias – the decision-maker seeks information about a previously formed  
hypothesis, ignoring or discounting cues to the contrary 
• Automation bias – an extension of conformation bias, the tendency of humans to trust 
computer recommendations without seeking contrary information. 
• Overconfidence bias – confidence exceeds prediction accuracy, thus the decision-makers stop 
seeking confirmation of their hypotheses 
• Assimilation bias - occurs when a person who is presented with new information that 
contradicts with a preexisting mental model assimilates the new information to fit into that 
mental model. 
 
One important aspect of human supervisory control in NCW is the exploitation of the benefits 
of NDM without bias interference.  To this end, research could explore what types of interface 
designs are best for this purpose, which types of biases are exhibited most strongly during each of the 
specific types of tasks detailed earlier, and how the introduction of automation that helps objectively 
assess probabilities changes operator decisions (one form of this is an optimal Bayesian agent). 
7. ATTENTION ALLOCATION 
A growing problem on roads today is driver distraction due to cognitive involvement in cell phone 
conversations.  Although opinions vary on the severity of the problem, a recent study estimated a rate of 2,600 
deaths a year in crashes on US roads due to cell phone use in 2002, as opposed to only 1,000 in 2000 
(Cohen and Graham 2003), identifying a disturbing trend.  Cohen and Graham also estimated that 
570,000 injuries a year and 1.5 million crashes resulting in property damage can be blamed on wireless 
phone use.  The cause of these accidents is inappropriate attention to the primary driving task, resulting in 
higher reaction times and lower situational awareness.  In many cases, the cell phone conversation may become 
the driver’s primary focus, instead of driving.   
 
An important task in supervisory control is often one of how to allocate attention between a set 
of dynamic tasks.  In deciding on an optimal allocation strategy, the operator acts to balance time 
constraints with relative importance of the required tasks.  Due to the expected increases in the 
number of available information sources in NCW, volume of information and operational tempo 
(see sections 2, 3 and 6) will place greater attentional demands on operators.  This is a fundamental 
and critical HSC problem in NCW.  There are two general areas where attention allocation issues are 
likely to occur in NCW: Preview times/stopping rule generation and primary task disruption by 
secondary tasks. 
Preview Times and Stopping Rules 
A general situation illustrating attention allocation issues with preview times is one where an 
operator expects sensor information at established time intervals to accomplish some task, and must 
act on this information before a deadline.  Entirely new tasks for the operator may also arrive at 
unexpected times.  For example, an air defense warfare coordinator (AWC) on a Navy ship could be 
responsible for several tasks: Identifying unknown air tracks as friendly, enemy or commercial air, 
monitoring these identified tracks, providing warnings to enemy aircraft within a certain radius, and 
providing launch orders for additional defensive aircraft against encroaching enemies.  Each of these 
tasks could involve numerous sub-tasks such as air traffic communications, visual confirmations, etc.  
Obviously some tasks are more important than others; shooting down threatening enemy aircraft is 
higher priority than tracking a commercial air flight.  Enemy and commercial air flight launches or a 
sudden re-classification of a track could represent unpredictable increases to task load.  Additionally, 
the AWC receives information updates only at discrete intervals as the radar sweeps by an area of 
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interest, or scheduled transmissions from equipment are received.  Thus the AWC operator expects 
information to arrive in a certain time interval that could reduce uncertainty, but is sometimes faced 
with time-critical decisions that may or may not be able to wait for this information.   
 
A central issue with the concept of preview times is how to maintain task priority when 
additional information is expected in the future, and how emergent situations influence an operator’s 
ability to assimilate this preview information.  Tulga and Sheridan (1980) investigated some aspects 
of this in a generic multi-task supervisory control paradigm.  They found that at high workloads, the 
time subjects planned ahead was inversely proportional to the inter-arrival rate of new tasks.  Using a 
similar paradigm, Moray et al. (1991) found that even if subjects were given an optimal scheduling 
rule, they were unable to implement it under enough time pressure, resorting instead to significantly 
non-optimal heuristic rules.  In both experiments however, it was not possible to gain new 
information about specific tasks that would influence planning, nor were there unexpected events 
that significantly changed the nature of the task.  It is clear from these initial efforts that more 
research is required to understand the effects of preview times, especially with information updates 
and unanticipated occurrences. 
 
A related issue to preview times is that of stopping rule generation.  Stopping rules are the 
criteria that individuals use to “satisfice” in uncertain situations, i.e. choosing the current best plan 
that is good enough.  The general problem is as follows: Say that an operator has initial information, 
such as locations of friendly and enemy forces, and incoming information of various reliabilities and 
different times of arrivals, such as updates on enemy movements from sources such as voice 
communications and satellite images.  The longer operators wait to make a decision on what to do 
with their forces, the more information they can gather (though not necessarily better due to its 
probabilistic nature), but they have a time limit in which to act.  An individual’s stopping rule would 
determine when the decision was made.  Another interesting issue would be to observe how and if 
initial decisions were changed as more information was received and final time deadlines approached.  
A better understanding of the relationship between stopping rules and preview times in NCW is 
needed because by its very nature, NCW hinges upon successful information sharing.  However, due 
to the stream of data from multiple sources and the need for rapid decisions, operators will have to 
weigh the benefits of gathering more information that will reduce uncertainty against the cost of a 
possibly delayed decision. 
Primary Task Disruption by Secondary Tasks 
Instead of a situation where an NCW operator has multiple dynamic tasks that vary in priority, 
consider a common scenario where the operator has a well-defined primary task along with 
secondary tasks.  In time-pressure scenarios, interruptions of a primary task caused by interruption 
mechanisms such as secondary tasks can increase mental processing time and induce errors in the 
primary task (Cellier and Eyrolle 1992; Cummings 2004).  In completing supervisory control tasks 
such as command and control or monitoring of displays, operators spend time monitoring unfolding 
events which may or may not be changing rapidly, and they also will periodically engage in interactive 
control tasks such as changing the course of UAVs or launching a missile. When task engagement 
occurs, operators must both concentrate attention on the primary task, but also be prepared for alerts 
for external events.  This need to concentrate on a task, yet maintain a level of attention for alerts, 
causes operators to have a conflict in mental information processing.  Concentration on a task 
requires “task-driven processing” which is likely to cause decreased sensitivity or attention to external 
events.  Interrupt-driven processing, needed for monitoring alerts, occurs when people are sensitized 
and expecting distraction.   
 
While interrupt and task driven processing can be present in a person, attention must be shared 
between the two and switching can incur cognitive costs that can potentially result in errors (Miyata 
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and Norman 1986).  The conflict between focusing on tasks and switching attention to interruptions 
is a fundamental problem for operators attempting to supervise a complex system which requires 
dedicated attention but also requires operators to respond to secondary tasks, such as 
communications or alerts from non-critical sub-systems.  In addition, Gopher et al. (1996) 
demonstrated that not only is there a measurable cost in response time and decision accuracy when 
switching attention between tasks, but costs are also incurred by the mere reconsideration of 
switching tasks.  The potential cost of such induced errors in NCW supervisory control systems may 
be extremely high.   
A more specific distraction problem likely to occur in NCW systems is that of operators 
becoming unintentionally fixated on secondary display information so that it becomes primary 
information.  This means the operator misses critical data, leading to a degradation of SA and 
possibly lower overall performance.  Many studies have investigated the effect of diverting attention 
to displays on the periphery (for examples see Maglio and Campbell (2000) or Somervell et al. 
(2001)), but very little work has determined how to design secondary displays so that they do not 
distract attention from the primary task.  For the most part, secondary displays have been designed as 
standalone information visualizations.  Somervell et al. (2002) begins to address this issue by 
identifying visual data density, presence time, and type of task the information is to be used for as 
influencing how secondary displays affect primary task performance.  However, much work remains 
to be done in this area, particularly for NCW purposes. 
8. SUPERVISORY MONITORING OF OPERATORS 
October 29, 1998, two Boeing 737s were on standard air routes from Darwin to Adelaide and Ayers Rock 
to Sydney, respectively, at the same flight level of 37,000 feet.  They were scheduled to conflict with each other, 
so protocol dictated that a 2,000 feet vertical separation standard be applied.  This was noted by both the air 
traffic controller and a supervisor assigned to that particular sector 90 minutes before the conflict actually 
occurred, and marked for later action.  In the next 90 minutes, traffic levels steadily increased and a third air 
traffic controller began to assist the other two already working in the conflict sector.  The third controller 
assumed the coordinator position and attempted to deal with any items that seemingly required attention as he 
attempted to gain some idea of the traffic disposition.  Despite the addition of a third coordinating ATC 
controller and the previous identification of the conflict, the pending conflict was subsequently overlooked.  
Instead, a violation of the minimum vertical separation distance occurred as one of the aircraft in question 
alerted ATC of the conflict at the last minute.  This was an instance where the supervisor failed to detect a 
major failure of his supervisee, despite indications that one might occur. 
A common operating structure in the military is one where a single supervisor oversees several 
human subordinates for the purpose of managing performance and relaying commands to the 
appropriate team members.  Under information age C2 structures, the need for this second function 
will be reduced (even eliminated in some cases), but performance monitoring will still be required.  
Frequently, these operators will be engaged in HSC tasks, so it will be the job of a supervisor to 
observe and diagnose HSC issues in one or more teams.   
HSC problems can sometimes be subtle in nature, and thus tend to be more difficult to detect 
than during many other types of operations.  Most HSC tasks are primarily cognitive in nature, so the 
supervisor cannot easily infer accurate performance from physical actions of operators.  Rather than 
being able to directly observe a task being completed by a human, the supervisor can only evaluate 
how an operator is interacting with automation that completes that same task, and once it is done, 
evaluate the results of that effort.  Physical actions taken by operators are limited to activities like 
typing, button pushing, and body movements to position themselves for better screen viewing.  
Furthermore, the effects of operators’ actions can occur in remote locations from both the 
supervisor and subordinates. This physical separation means that all people involved with the process 
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must form mental abstractions to envision a complete picture of the situation.  Complicating this is 
that interaction is usually done through artifacts with inherent limitations, such as voice 
communication, data links, and 2-dimensional screens.  While this is clearly a problem with individual 
operators (it is one of the primary considerations when designing automation of this type), it is an 
even larger one for supervisors, who must try to synthesize information from multiple operators at 
once.  Furthermore, isolating a single cause for poor performance of an entire team can be difficult, 
especially in time-pressured environments characteristic of NCW environments.  Lastly, decreases in 
performance may be the result of automation degradation and have nothing to do with the human.  
Supervisors may have difficulty separating the two. 
The main problem is then how to support supervisors of HSC tasks so that they are better able 
to understand what their subordinates are doing.  Many of the issues previously discussed in this 
report factor into this discussion.  In order to quickly observe and diagnose HSC problems, 
supervisors must have a high level of SA, both for individuals and teams.  Even more so than their 
subordinates, it is critical that HSC supervisors have a clear picture of the team’s overall situation.  The 
building block to achieving this superior level of SA is access to and absorption of all relevant data.  
Therefore, information overload will be a particularly acute problem, as a supervisor could be 
responsible for any or all of the information available to their numerous subordinates.  Additionally, 
due to the greater range of information types received by HSC supervisors as compared to a single 
operator, the number of possible relationships and behaviors of this data is higher.  This means that 
the complexity of the situation for the supervisor is raised along all three dimensions simultaneously. 
Another issue with supervisory monitoring is how to rectify HSC problems once they are 
detected.  There are several options, which may be applied singly or in concert to varying degrees:  
1) Provide a warning to the human whose performance is low at the time. 
It may be the case that operators do not realize that their performance has dropped below 
acceptable levels, and merely need to be reminded of it and/or motivated to get back on 
track.  An operator’s attention may be inappropriately allocated, so a warning provided by 
the supervisor (who is monitoring their performance) could cue them to correct it.  Of 
course, if an operator is already cognitively overloaded then the warning could have no 
effect, or even a negative one due to the additional distraction it would provide. 
2) Redistribute the task load between existing team members. 
Workload could be unevenly distributed within a team, or various team members could be 
more skilled at certain tasks than others at certain times, so dynamically shifting tasks would 
allow other team members to pick up the slack.  If all team members are equally busy or if 
others lack the expertise needed to perform tasks, this redistribution will not work.  
Additionally, the complexity of dynamically allocating tasks between team members puts a 
significant cognitive load on the supervisor. 
3) Change the number of team members or teams on the underperforming task. 
Potential and existing team members or teams could be humans, computers, or a 
combination of both.  It is also important to remember that poor performance can result 
from underload as well as overload.  In this case, the supervisor would observe an 
unacceptable level of performance from a subordinate and initiate a process to either relieve 
that operator of the most problematic aspects of their tasks, or add to their workload, as 
required.  This change could be manifested in one of two ways: 1) A changing of the level of 
automation experienced by that operator (driven by a supervisor), or 2) The addition or 
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subtraction of a human or computer team member.  Changing the number of team members 
requires planning, as the new team members must have access to the correct equipment, 
programming and training to be effective.  As before, there must be an efficient way to 
reassign jobs between team members. In addition, while changing the number of team 
members may help in the longer term to reduce overall workload and/or improve 
performance, there will be a transition period with associated costs for team and individual 
SA as well as individual and team performance. 
4) Modify the mission objectives or timeline to accommodate lowered overall performance. 
This is a straightforward solution, but not one that will always be available in military 
situations.  Many missions have time-sensitive deadlines that cannot be altered.  Similarly, 
lower level mission objectives may be part of a larger operation, and therefore are not 
flexible. 
Finally, the question of whether the supervisor should be a human or a computer should be 
discussed.  Using a computer offers advantages and disadvantages in this regard.  A computer would 
eliminate information capacity issues and the need for refined HCI designs.  However, it would 
operate on defined rules and would be relatively inflexible in the face of unknown situations.  The 
computer would also lack the capability of a human to predict future performance based on 
subjective judgments from visual observations and face-to-face interactions.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
MIT Candidate NCW Experimental Platforms 
Multi-Modal Workstation (MMWS) 
The Multi-Modal Workstation (Figure 7), developed by ONR/SPAWAR, is a platform available 
for research in the MIT Humans and Automation Lab, directed by Professor Cummings.  The 
computer is a dual-processor 450MHz Pentium III machine that drives 4 Elo-Touch touch screen 
monitors, three 20” in size and one 15”.  Additional user interfaces include a wireless keyboard, 
trackball mouse and numeric keypad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  The Multi-Modal Workstation, as set-up at MIT 
The MMWS is a versatile machine that could host a number of different experiments, each in 
some way exploring some aspects of the HSC issues described in the main body of the report.  Two 
propriety applications, developed by SPAWAR for their experiments, are available.  The first is called 
Air Defense Warfare (ADW), and involves managing all tasks associated with tracking, identifying 
and tasking all classes of aircraft within a particular radius of a US Navy fleet.  The second 
application is called Land Attack Warfare (LAW).  This program requires a user to coordinate all of 
the logistics of planning and re-planning, as well as monitor a battery of Tomahawk missiles launched 
from a US Navy vessel to numerous land attack targets.  Either one or both applications may be used 
for NCW investigations.    
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Intelligent Systems Technology (ISTI) ProcessEdge™ and Knowport™ Software 
The MIT Humans and Automation Lab has access to two ISTI applications that could be used 
in NCW experiments - ProcessEdge™ and Knowport™.  ProcessEdge™ is an organizational design 
tool meant to facilitate process design, re-invention, analysis and visualization (Madni 2000).  
Through this software, research into optimal organizational structures to improve distributed 
decision making and team coordination could be performed.  ProcessEdge™ is a standalone 
software package, making it relatively easy to set up and cheap to buy.   
Knowport™ is a mobile platform application offering common knowledge access and decision 
support to distributed team members.  It requires a server-client architecture be set up, in which the 
server contains a central data library accessed by smart software agents.  The clients are mobile 
PDAs, and would be carried around in the field by soldiers and other military personnel.  For 
experimental purposes, the MMWS could be used as the central depository of knowledge and team 
coordinator for the system.  As should be clear from this brief description, Knowport™ will be 
relatively difficult to work with and expensive to buy, but the range of experimental possibilities for 
the purposes of NCW are exponentially greater than ProcessEdge™.    
